



# Parked Vehicle Assisted VFC System with Smart Parking: An Auction Approach

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# Outline



- Background & Motivation
- Problem Formulation
- Auction Design
- Simulation Results
- Conclusion

# Background & Motivation



## Mobile edge computing (MEC)


Offload the urgent computation workload from cloud to edge.

However, the fog computing service is limited:

- Density of RSUs.
- Heavy load of RSUs from service requests.
- Deployment cost of RSUs.

Communication & Computation

Low latency service




# Background & Motivation



## Vehicular fog computing (VFC)

Modern vehicles become more and more powerful.

- On-the-move vehicles  $\Rightarrow$  VANETs
- Parked vehicles  $\Rightarrow$  Parking vehicle assistance (PVA)



The parked vehicles act as static network infrastructures.

# Background & Motivation




## Smart parking system (SPS)

Increased population and limited parking places of a city

When on-the-move vehicles search for parking slots:

- Cause traffic congestion
- Waste unnecessary time and energy

SPS guides the vehicles to the available parking slots with less effort, time and fuel consumption.



# Background & Motivation



We consider a robust VFC system:

## PVA in VFC + Smart parking

Benefits:


- Improves the **traffic** and **parking** efficiency.
- Attract the vehicles with fog capability to park at proper parking spaces to **assist the delay-sensitive computing services**.
- The fog service provider can achieve **cost saving** by turning off redundant fog computing servers.
- The parked vehicles receive **monetary rewards** to compensate their service cost.

# Problem Formulation



We provide a **parked vehicle assisted VFC system**:

- Fog network controller (FNC) (maintain sufficient FNs)
- Hotspots (consist of delay-sensitive computation requests)
- Parking places (private or public)
- On-the-move vehicles (fog capability)



**Fog-capable vehicles** has potential to offload the computation workload from the FNs near the hotspots when they are also parked nearby.

# Problem Formulation




## Parking places:

- Parking slot inventory
- Reserve price

## Hotspots:

- Workload arrival rate
- Delay toleration



## Fog network controller (FNC):

- Operation energy cost
- Play monetary rewards for service offloading




# Problem Formulation



## On-the-move vehicles:

- Current car position
- Traveling destination
- Average driving speed
- Walking speed

- Remaining driving time
- Walking time (traveling toleration)
- Driving energy cost



**Private information**

Parking duration


**Fog capability:** CPU as the unit of computing resource

Service delay = queuing delay + network delay (delay toleration)

# Problem Formulation



## Objective:



- **Parking places:** receive more parking income
- **FNC:**  $\max$  ( Energy cost saving – offload expense )
- **Smart vehicles:**  
 $\text{Max (service reward – service cost - parking payment - traveling time - traveling cost)}$


It motivates us to employ a **parking reservation auction** to regulate the proposed VFC system.

# Auction Design



## Reservation Auction Model


- Formulated on a rolling horizon of time slot intervals
- Starts at the decision point periodically.



# Auction Design



## Reservation Auction Model



# Auction Design



## Strategy of smart vehicles:

For each candidate parking place,

Can cheat



**Bidding vector** = (Parking Value, Selected hotspot, # of CPU)


## Strategy of FNC:

**Allocation rule:** to maximize the aggregate utility of vehicles



Maximum weight perfect bipartite matching (MWPBM) problem

Solved by Classic Kuhn-Munkres (KM) algorithm  $O(N^3)$





**Payment rule:** Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism with Clarke pivot payments

**Economic properties:** {  
1) Incentive compatible  
2) Individually rational  
3) Budget balance

# Simulation Results





Performance versus the number of vehicles:



intensified competition

Allocation ratio of vehicles

Avg. utility of vehicles



additional income

Profit of FNC


Avg. parking income (per vehicle)

The proposed auction provides win-win performance enhancement.

# Simulation Results




Performance versus the increment of offload price:




Avg. utility of vehicles

higher compensation

attracts more CPUs



# of assisted CPUs



Profit of FNC

unnecessary offload payments

An optimal choice of offload price exists and deserves further study in the future.

# Conclusion



- We propose a VFC system by combining both PVA and smart parking.
- The proposed auction guarantee incentive compatible, individually rationality and budget balance.
- A win-win performance enhancement is achieved among FNC, smart vehicles and parking places.





# The End

# Thank You!